The bidding war has started. Each of the Presidential candidates is desperately trying to outbid the other. As the song goes, each candidate is saying "What you can do I can do better". However, over the years the electorate has become very cynical of the empty and unrealistic pledges made by politicians. For instance, an economic growth rate of 8 or 10 percent is just not possible in the current background of reports that the LTTE is preparing for war, and the killings as well as serious daily violations of human rights on an extraordinary scale that continue to be committed by them.

The failure of the international community to get the LTTE to any meaningful commitment as regards these violations means that the state of civil unrest would continue unabated. At the best of times, growth rates as pledged by the candidates are possible only if there is an enduring peace and a sustained political stability. In the absence of such circumstances, to promise growth rates of 8 to 10 percent is clearly a disingenuous attempt to hoodwink the electorate.

Both candidates hope to bring the needed conditions for economic growth through negotiations. Mr. Wickremesinghe hopes to negotiate a settlement with the LTTE modeled on federalism. This is a non-starter because the powers sought by an untransformed LTTE under such an arrangement would be so extreme (a glimpse of which is contained in the ISGA), that the people are bound to reject them.

The exercise would be no different to the infamous Pacts between leaders in the past. Failure to win the support of the people would be sighted as another example of a broken promise by the Sinhalese-dominated government. Such outcomes are inevitable when deals are made by leaders who are unmindful of the core civilizational values of the Sri Lankan people, the principal one being the guarantee of security that comes from a holistic unitary state.

Mr. Rajapakse on the other hand, intends to first develop a consensus with all the communities, and then negotiate with the LTTE. Although such a consultative approach could and would evolve a political arrangement that would be acceptable to all communities including the moderate Tamils, it would be unacceptable to the LTTE.

The reason is that since such an arrangement would naturally be based on democratic norms, human rights and pluralism, it would deny the LTTE the ‘sole representative’ status under which it wants to retain the means to exercise absolute power over the Tamil people, and be the one to forge the political formation of the Sri Lankan state in a manner that would not require them to transform, while it the means to exercise absolute coercion.

Both approaches would fail to resolve the national question for sustained economic growth. However, Mr. Rajapakse’s approach has the merit that for the first time a serious attempt would have been made to hammer out an arrangement that is acceptable to all communities, without the participation of the LTTE. The exercise would test Mr. Rajapakse’s skills as a leader, a taste of which was demonstrated when he withstood the pressures of the incumbent President and her priorities. No effort should be spared to make this approach a success as it would serve to demonstrate most of all to ourselves and to the international community, of our ability to determine what is best for us by ourselves free of external meddling.

Failure to reach a consensus would only strengthen the hand and importance of the LTTE and they would do everything in their power to prevent such a consensus being reached. On the other hand, a national consensus even if all of its provisions are not immediately fully implementable, would weaken and marginalize the LTTE and be the most effective non-military counter to neutralize the LTTE and make it irrelevant.

Some sections of the electorate have convinced themselves much against their better judgment that the LTTE would accept a federal solution because of vague statements issued by the Norwegians following talks in Oslo. As stated before, the scope of the federal arrangements sought by the LTTE would not be acceptable to the rest of the country. Even a more watered down version of federalism would be rejected as long as the federal unit is based on both Northern and Eastern Provinces. Without a consensus for a federal arrangement in a form acceptable that means de-merging the two provinces, it would not be possible to change the constitution. Under these circumstances, the undertaking by Mr. Wickremesinghe to negotiate a federal option with the LTTE to resolve the national question is devoid of realism.

The only realistic approach is to make a serious and genuine effort to demonstrate in a tangible form that it possible for Sri Lankans to live as a community of communities. In this regard the first step should be to formulate an inclusive cabinet where at least 25% of the cabinet posts are assigned to non-Sinhalese. At least some of these posts should be of significant national influence, with one important post, even the Primership, being offered to Mr. Anandasangaree (provided he gives up his undemocratic stand for retaining the Eastern Province "at any cost"). Two separate Ministries should be created, one for the Northern Province and the other for the Eastern Province, in order to implement the tsunami affected reconstruction and rehabilitation programme.

The second step should be to constitute the entire Parliament into a series of Legislative Committees with oversight powers over specified Ministries. The composition of these committees should reflect the same ratio as the government to opposition in Parliament. Thus, the entire Parliament would be intimately involved in the processes of governance. Furthermore, with the Legislative Committees having authority to oversee Executive action the process of governance would become transparent.

The third step should be for the President to appoint District Ministers whose primary function would be to act as Project Managers to monitor and coordinate the programmes of the line ministries in the respective Districts.

The fourth step should be the conduct of a referendum in the Eastern Province to determine whether the province should be separate or be merged with the Northern Province as required by the Constitution.

The country can move forward only if we understand and acknowledge the following realities:

1. That the LTTE is not going to transform whatever the size of the carrot and whoever hopes that it would. Consequently, the particular brand of federalism sought by the LTTE to suit its present formation would not be acceptable to the rest of Sri Lanka. Under these circumstances, hoping to resolve the national question through negotiations is an exercise in futility.

2. That every effort should be explored to reach a consensus with all communities based on norms of democracy, human rights, pluralism and the outcome of a referendum as to the status of the Eastern Province as required by the Constitution.

3. That a Constitutional change from unitary to federal is not possible given the existing political formations in Parliament. Under the circumstances, what a pragmatic future President could do would be to share power at the center to the extent possible under present Constitutional provisions.

Acknowledging these ground realities means that the scope to change the structural formation of the Sri Lankan state is limited. However, what is possible within the existential realities is to implement arrangements for all communities to participate in the processes of governance through which the concept of a ‘national community’ out of the communities could be forged.